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I. INTRODUCTION
The words "merit review"1 conjure up images of overbroad admin-
istrative discretion and paternalism in the minds of some members of
the legal, financial, and business communities. However, the full
scope of merit review is understood and appreciated by few. Armed
with a lack of knowledge, state legislatures across the country are de-
bating the propriety of their state's "blue sky" laws.2 The reasons ad-
1. "Merit review" is a term used to describe a standard of review for securities offer-
ings by state securities regulators. It is also referred to as the fair, just, and equi-
table regulation standard.
2. The exact origin of the term "blue sky" is unclear. The term refers to state secur-
ities laws. Generally, such laws were known as "blue sky" because they were
aimed at preventing "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so
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vanced for change do not always withstand challenge, and the
justifications given for maintaining the status quo often have little or
no empirical support. Thus, it is a visceral and emotional battle: what
to do with merit review.
Merit review refers to the discretion of a state securities commis-
sioner to make qualitative decisions regarding the "merits" of an offer-
ing or sale of securities in that state.3 Unlike the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC),4 which cannot pass on the merits of a
securities offering, most state agencies are empowered to play judge
and jury regarding the structure of an offering. These state agencies
can refuse to allow the registration of an offering to become effective
if it is deemed "unfair, unjust or inequitable," 5 or if certain statutory
or administrative regulations are not satisfied.
The scope of merit review is best defined by what it is not. Merit
review is not a government guarantee of the offering. If a "deal"6
passes state muster there is no promise of success; the investor still
bears the risk of his or her investment. Merit review is not the regula-
tion or prevention of fraud. Every state has some form of antifraud
language in its "blue sky" laws that is distinct from merit review.7 Be-
sides, most securities frauds occur because someone failed to register
many feet of blue sky." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917). See
generally L. Loss & E. CowETT, BLUE SKY LAW 7 (1958); Goodkind, Blue Sky
Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements, 76 Wis. L. REV. 79 (1976); Tyler,
More About Blue Sky, 39 W. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1971); Walker & Hadway, Merit
Standard Revisited. An Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Stan-
dards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651 (1982); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 501, at 508 (1985). See
infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
3. For a listing of each state's securities administrator and his or her title, see 1
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 6001 (1985).
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission, created by Congress on July 2, 1934, is
an independent, bipartisan, quasi-judicial government agency. The Commission
is made up of five members appointed by the President, with Congressional ap-
proval. Not more than three members can be from the same political party. The
Commission's duty is to enforce the federal securities laws. It is, however, power-
less to pass upon the merits of securities offerings. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 22-23 (1981).
5. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1109.01(2) (1983) ("The director may issue an order
denying effectiveness to, or suspend or revoke the effectiveness of, a registration
statement. . . if ... the plan of financing is unfair, unjust, inequitable, dishon-
est, oppressive, or fraudulent or would tend to work a fraud upon the
purchaser.").
6. "Deal" is a term used in the securities field that denotes an offering or sale of
securities.
7. See Goodkind, supra note 2, at 79 n.2. Antifraud provisions generally make it
unlawful to "employ any device scheme or artiface to defraud; (b) make or omit
any statement of material fact; or (c) engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates as a fraud." Id Merit review goes beyond the scope of
antifraud statutes by allowing a securities commissioner to refuse an offering con-
sidered to be structured unfairly, even if it is not fraudulent. See also H. BLOO-
MENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 10.02 (5th ed. 1984).
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or fully disclose. Merit review is not such that "bad" deals are refused
while "good" deals are allowed. Instead, the state looks at the struc-
ture of an offering and the relationship between the public and the
insiders.8 If all of the regulatory or statutory conditions are met, the
offering must be allowed, whether it is risky or not. In essence, with
merit review, investors must receive some minimum equity for their
contribution. Unless the company or promoter can justify less, the of-
fering is not allowed.
The merit controversy revolves around the offer and sale of securi-
ties.9 The situation can be explained by examining an oversimplified
hypothetical investment transaction. An individual (X) needs capital
to go into business or to expand an existing business. X has many
options.10 She may finance the entire endeavor herself, if possible, or
borrow from friends or relatives.11 She may receive a loan from a
bank if she has sufficient credit and collateral. She may try small
business investment companies, insurance companies, venture capital-
ists, or the Small Business Administration. Or she may attempt to sell
shares of her business to raise the money. It is the last option, when a
security1 2 is offered or sold,13 that state and federal securities laws
come into play.14
8. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
9. In order to offer or sell securities in Nebraska, for example, the securities must
be registered with the Department of Banking, Bureau of Securities, unless the
securities or the transaction is exempt. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1104 (1983). See in-
fra note 15.
10. J. MoFKsY, BLUE SKY RESTRIcTIONs ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 19-27 (1971).
See also Jones, Financing Small Business, in CREATIVE BUSINESS FINANCING 55-
60 (V. Nordin ed. 1968).
11. It must be noted that even loans from friends and neighbors may be considered
securities for purposes of federal and blue sky laws. Because this Article is fo-
cused on equity securities, the ramifications of debt securities will not be ad-
dressed. See infra note 12.
12. Securities laws are triggered only when a "security" is sold. Nebraska's law,
which is similar to the federal statute, defines a security as "any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture,.., investment contract .... NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 8-1101(12) (1983). Cf Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. II 1984)) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act].
Whether or not an instrument or a deal contemplates the offer or sale of a secur-
ity has long remained an issue of controversy. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver,
455 U.S. 551 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979);
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
13. "Offer" or "sale" means any transaction by which securities are offered to an
individual or to the general public. When a purchaser's money is received and a
stock certificate transferred, both an offer and a sale will be deemed to have oc-
curred under blue sky laws. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 7, at § 10; 1 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 1751 (1985).
14. Financing by the sale of securities is not the only method of raising capital. In
some situations it is not the best nor the most feasible method. It is simply one
alternative. See supra note 11 & infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
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Unless an exemption exists,' 5 any security that X offers or sells in
a specific state must be registered with that state and the federal gov-
ernment. 16 The rules and procedures for each state differ radically,
however, making it difficult for X to comply with each state's law.17
So X hires an attorney, an accountant,' 8 a printer,19 and an under-
writer 20 to put the deal together. To cover the costs of the offering,
which will be prohibitive,2 ' and still retain sufficient working capital,
X bargains with her investors. Financially sophisticated investors will
generally insist on some amount of control.22 However, when inexpe-
rienced, unsophisticated, or unknowledgeable investors enter the pic-
15. If an exemption applies, the offering may not be subject to either the merit or
disclosure requirements. There are two types of exemptions: transaction exemp-
tions and securities exemptions. A transaction exemption allows certain offer-
ings to be made without registration of the securities. For example, transactions
by executors, bankruptcy trustees, or guardians and conservators are exempt in
Nebraska. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1111(6) (1983). The federal law sets forth specific
transaction exemptions in § 4 of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a to 77aa
(1982). Section 3(a)(11), the intrastate exemption, is also a transaction exemption
even though it is listed under the exempt securities provision. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(11) (1982).
Certain securities are also exempt from registration no matter who sells or
offers them. Exempt securities include: United States government securities; se-
curities issued by any state or federal bank, savings institution, or trust company;
and securities listed or approved for listing on the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Stock Exchange, or the Midwest Stock Exchange. Securities exempt
from registration in Nebraska are listed in NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1110 (1983). For
federal securities exemptions, see 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982). For a general list of
transactions and securities that are generally exempt under blue sky laws, see 1
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1991-2155 (1985).
16. 1933 Act, supra note 12; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-1101 to 1124 (1983); Braisted, Regu-
lation of Securities by States, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 15, 20, col. 1.
17. Goodkind, supra note 2, at 83. See generally BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) (1985).
18. When registering securities with the state or federal government, balance sheets,
average net earnings, and profit or loss statements must be filed. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 77g (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-1105(2)(j) & 8-1107(2)(n) (1983).
19. Although there is no requirement that the prospectus must be professionally
printed, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.403 (1985), most offering statements that will be dis-
tributed in connection with offerings of securities are formally printed by print-
ing companies at great expense.
20. An "underwriter" sells securities and is defined as "any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connec-
tion with, the distribution of any security .... 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982).
21. Schneider, Manko & Kant, Going Public-Practice, Procedure and Consequence,
27 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1, 42 (1981). The authors concluded, five years ago, that
legal fees alone for an offering of five million dollars are generally between
$75,000 to $100,000. In addition, printing charges run close to $100,000. Larger
charges are not uncommon. The underwriter's discount accounts for another 7-10
percent of the offering price. Id. See also J. MOFKSY, supra note 10, at 47.
22. "[The issuer] will have to approach wealthy individuals if he is to raise the needed
sum, and he finds that the few financially sophisticated persons who are willing
to invest. . . the requisite capital in the proposed venture insist on receiving a
majority stock interest for their group." J. MOFSKY, supra note 10, at 47.
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ture, X has an advantage. She is able to sell a small share of the
company to the investor for a grossly disproportionate sum. 23
Merit review prohibits such imbalance between the public and the
promoter. Clearly not every investor needs or wants government pro-
tection or intervention. But merit review is just that: state govern-
ment steps in between the investor and promoter and requires that
the deal be reformed because the relationship between the parties is
inequitable.
On January 15, 1985, Nebraska State Senator John DeCamp intro-
duced LB 192,24 which attempted to eliminate merit review from Ne-
braska's "blue sky" laws. LB 192 was killed in the second session of
the Eighty-Ninth Legislature. In its place Sen. DeCamp introduced
LB 801. LB 801 is a stronger version of LB 192 and would have the
same effect-to eliminate merit review from Nebraska blue sky
laws.25 This Article will examine the need for LB 801, its scope, and
its potential effects.26 First, a cursory examination of the past history
and present trends of merit review will be set forth. Second, the his-
tory and current status of Nebraska merit provisions will be reviewed.
Third, the results of eliminating administrative discretion will be ana-
lyzed. Finally, alternative proposals for change will be offered.
23. A review of several filings in Illinois in 1983 provides excellent examples of such
disproportionate control. If the proposed sale of securities by Blackgold Energy
Resources, Inc. had been approved, insiders would have owned 50 percent of the
company, having paid only $225,000. Public investors would have paid $1,500,000
for their 50 percent, nearly seven times as much for the same amount of control!
After the sale of stock proposed by Long Island Video Time, insiders would con-
trol 69 percent of the company, for an investment of $8,394. Public purchasers, on
the other hand, would own 31 percent of the company, for which they would pay
$450,000-over 50 times what insiders paid for a little over twice the control. 1983
ILL. MERIT REVIEW FORMS.
24. The bill remained in committee during the 1985 legislative session. Senator De-
Camp indicated last year that he intended to make LB 192 a priority bill in the
1986 session. Interview with Sen. John DeCamp, Chairman of the Nebraska Leg-
islature Banking, Commerce and Ins. Com., in Lincoln, Neb. (Mar. 5, 1985). Dur-
ing the 1985 Legislative session, there was one vote to advance the bill out of
committee. The attempt to advance failed, three in favor and three opposed. One
Senator abstained, and one Senator was absent.
25. This Article is not intended to be a review or compilation of the various states'
securities laws. Only Nebraska merit review is analyzed.
26. LB 801 would, among other things, delete the language in § 8-1102 regarding
fraud and add language making it explicit that "[n]o rule shall impose the condi-
tions enumerated in section 8-1109.01 as grounds for issuance of a stop order, for
denial of registration, or as a basis for any other action .... " LB 801, 89th Neb.
Leg., 2d Sess., § 3 (1986). The bill and its amendments, see Neb. Leg. J., Jan. 24,
1986, at 513-18, may be obtained from the Legislature's Bill Room in the State
Capitol. The bill was advanced to the floor from the Banking Committee without





At the turn of the century, when worthless securities and fraudu-
lent ventures were widespread, several states enacted consumer pro-
tection laws.27 The first registration law, passed in 1903 in
Connecticut required the registration of oil and mining securities. 28
Kansas, often credited with being the first state to require registration
of securities, 29 followed in 1911, with a "comprehensive licensing sys-
tem" applicable to the sale of securities and those engaged in the busi-
ness of securities.30 The Kansas law, enacted in an emotional climate,
had a profound effect on the direction of other state securities laws.
Within two years, twenty-three states, including Nebraska, had fol-
lowed suit.31 At this time, there was no federal legislative scheme.
Federal intervention came in 1933, in the aftermath of the stock
market crash of 1929. Upon the recommendation of President
Roosevelt, the federal government enacted a comprehensive securities
law.32 Simply stated, it requires that any initial interstate offering or
sale of securities that is not exempt must be registered with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC does not have the
power to judge the offering on its "merits."33 Federal registration re-
27. L. Loss & E. CowE=T, supra note 2, at 7-11; J. MOFSKY, supra note 10, at 9-12; 1
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 501 (1985).
28. L. Loss & E. CowE=r, supra note 2, at 5.
29. See, e.g., J. MOFSKY, supra note 10, at 10; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 501 (1985).
30. L. Loss & E. CowETr, supra note 2, at 7. The reason for Kansas' extensive law
has been explained as follows: "The state of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific
and rich in farming products has a large proportion of agriculturists not versed in
ordinary business methods. The State was the happy hunting ground of promot-
ers of fraudulent enterprises; in fact their frauds became so barefaced that it was
stated that they would sell building lots in blue sky in fee simple." Mulvey, Blue
Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. T. 37 (1916), quoted in L. Loss & E. CowET, supra note 2, at
7 n.22.
31. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. J. MOFSKY, supra note 10, at 14 n.35.
32. 1933 Act, supra note 12. The 1933 Act had two main objectives: "(a) to provide
investors with material financial and other information concerning securities of-
fered for public sale; and (b) to prohibit misrepresentation, deceit and other
fraudulent acts .... R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 4, at 23. It should be
noted that merit review, although in effect in most states, did not play a large role
in the stock market crash of 1929. Merit review regulates initial public offerings
while the stock market deals in "secondary" trading.
33. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 4, at 23-28. The reason that a disclosure
only system was selected was explained in the 1933 Congressional debate, which
focused on the need for full disclosure:
Since the crash of 1929 we have witnessed a steady downfall in the gen-
eral price structure of commodities and securities .... Today, as a Con-
gress, we are considering a measure to correct the ills of the past .... It
is generally recognized that the lack of complete disclosure was one of
[Vol. 65:413
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quires only full and total disclosure of all material information that an
investor needs to make an informed investment decision. 34 The ra-
tional for the "disclosure only" system, as explained by President
Roosevelt, was "to protect the public with the least possible interfer-
ence to honest business."35
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, there began a surge of opposition
to state merit review.36 Although most states retained some form of
substantive review of securities offerings, to date there are eight so-
called "free"37 states: Illinois, New Jersey,38 New York, Utah, Colo-
rado, Florida, Louisiana, and Nevada.39 Generally, in a "free" state, an
application for registration of securities may be denied for inadequate
disclosure, fraud, or other specific acts, but not on "merit" grounds.
For nearly a decade the controversy abated. But today the battle
against merit review is again in full swing. In 1983, Iowa revised its
statutory authority.40 The Illinois legislature enacted an entirely re-
the major contributing factors associated with inflation of security values
which preceded the crash of 1929.
77 CONG. REc. 2939-40 (1933) (statement of Rep. Koppleman). Other comments
included: "Open the books. Honest business does not require secrecy. Crooked
business should not be allowed to profit by secrecy." Id. at 2944 (statement of
Rep. Keller); "[Full information [should] be given to the public regarding the
soundness of the security offered for sale .... The pending bill does not in any
way interfere with the various states of the Union from writing such legislation
as they may see fit ... to protect their citizens." Id. at 2950 (statement of Rep.
Reilly).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982). Registration is required to provide investors with financial
and other information in order to properly evaluate the merits of an offer and
sale of securities. "The only standard which must be met in the registration of
securities is an adequate and accurate disclosure of the material facts concerning
the company and the securities it proposed to sell." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
supra note 4, at 23-24.
35. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (Message from the President).
36. Sargent, Blue Sky Law, 12 SEc. REG. L.J. 276, 278 (1984).
37. A free state does not exercise merit review. In addition to the eight states listed
and well-known as free states, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Connecticutt, Hawaii
and Georgia have blue sky laws without merit language.
38. The New Jersey House and Senate are currently studying proposals to add some
form of administrative review to the process of securities registration. Telephone
interview with James McClelland Smith, Chief of N.J. Bur. Sec., December 12,
1985.
39. States Stop Playing Detective for Investors, Bus. WK., July 16, 1984, at 131 [here-
inafter cited as States Stop].
40. The 1976 law, IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.209 (West 1976), governed the "[d]enial, sus-
pension and revocation of registration," and provided:
1. The administrator may issue a stop order denying effectiveness to, or
suspending or revoking the effectiveness of, any registration statement if
the administrator finds that the order is in the public interest and that:
(e) The issuance or sale of the securities is or would be unfair or inequi-
table to purchasers or has worked or tended to work a fraud upon pur-
chasers or would so operate.
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vised Securities Act in 1984.41 The Texas legislature has twice, in the
past two years, declined to act in the face of expensive attempts to
eliminate administrative review. 4 2 Louisiana lost its merit review law
in 1985,43 while similar rumblings about merit repeal have been made
in Missouri, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky and Arizona. 44
Opinions regarding the merit controversy are diverse and wide-
spread. The North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA),45 a voluntary, non-profit corporation composed of state se-
The 1983 amendment, effective July 1, 1984, amended subparagraph (e) to pro-
vide that:
(e) The issuance or sale of securities has worked or tended to work a
fraud upon purchasers or would so operate; ... and...
(h) The financial condition of the issuer affects or would affect the
soundness of the securities, except that the applications for registration
of securities by companies which are in the developmental stage shall
not be denied based solely upon the financial condition of the company.
For purposes of this rule, a "developmental stage company" is defined as
a company which has been in existence for five years or less.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.209 (West 1985). It should be noted that Iowa is still essen-
tially a merit review state.
41. The Illinois Securities Law of 1953 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 121 1/2, § 137.1
(1981)), was amended by House Bill 663 on Apr. 28, 1983. The Illinois General
Assembly passed these amendments on June 29, 1983. On Aug. 4, 1983, Governor
James R. Thompson signed the bill into law. See generally R. FEIN & S. SOSIN,
THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE ILLINOIS SECURITIES LAW OF 1953 (1983). Roger
Fein and Sidney Sosin, Illinois securities law attorneys, were instrumental in
drafting and passing the changes. Telephone interview with Roger Fein, in Chi-
cago, Ill. (Mar. 18, 1985).
There is much dissatisfaction with the new Illinois statute within the Ill. Sec.
Dept. However, the statute will probably not be reviewed by the Illinois Legisla-
ture for several years. Interview with Jack Herstein, Securities Examiner, Neb.
Dept. Banking, in Lincoln, Neb. (Mar. 13, 1985).
42. Telephone interview with Tom Spratlin, Asst. Dir. Tex. Sec. Reg. Div., in Austin,
Tex. (Mar. 18, 1985). Mr. Spratlin noted that the Texas Bar Association had
taken a position against merit review. In fact, he said that the bar had raised
more money to lobby against merit review than his entire operating budget for a
year. Estimates of the lobbying efforts expense were upwards of one million dol-
lars. Telephone calls to the Texas Bar Ass'n office in Austin failed to confirm
this information.
43. The Louisiana blue sky law was amended by Laws 1985, Act 722, on July 16, 1985.
The new statute went into effect Sept. 6, 1985.
44. Sargent, supra note 36, at 282-85; Fitzpatrick, New Jersey's Blue Sky Law, 115
N.J.L.J., May 23, 1985, at 12, col. 3.
45. The North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA) is a
not-for-profit corporation. The Association's membership consists of securities
administrators from the United States, Puerto Rico, the Canadian provinces and
territories, and Mexico, who are charged with the responsibility of administering
and enforcing their respective securities laws.
The objectives of the Association include:
1. Supporting the principles of investor protection;
2. Promoting, so far as practical, the uniformity of legislation dealing
with the regulation of securities or the suppression of frauds;
3. Preserving the integrity of the legitimate capital markets;
[Vol. 65:413
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curity administrators, directors, and commissioners, is vocally opposed
to the elimination of merit review.46 Bills have been drafted and pro-
posed in Florida and New Jersey to attempt to provide those state se-
curities departments with "merit" review authority.47 The New
Jersey State Bar Association and the New Jersey Business and Indus-
try Association are working to reform New Jersey's status as a "free"
state.48 The Texas Bar Association has gone on record as being op-
posed to the Texas merit review,49 and actively lobbied for passage of a
"disclosure only" system. 0 The American Bar Association Securities
Division has also established an ad hoc committee to examine state
blue sky laws.51
It is not clear exactly why there is a renewed fervor to eliminate
merit review. Some commentators speculate that it is a result of the
Reagan administration deregulation philosophy,52 or that it is due to a
down trend in the securities market. 53 Whatever the source, oppo-
4. Providing a forum for the mutual discussion and treatment of
problems common to securities regulatory and enforcement
agencies;
5. Developing guidelines, procedures or rules of fair practice related to
the offer and sale of securities and rules to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts.
The regulations of the Association achieve authoritative status by the mem-
bers' implementation of such promulgations in their respective jurisdictions.
46. A resolution adopted by the Association at its annual meeting in 1983 states:
Whereas the membership of the North American Securities Adminis-
trators Association Association, Inc., recognizes that member states in-
clude jurisdictions who afford investor protection by requiring "merit"
standards for securities offered to the public;
Whereas efforts have been made to weaken the "merit" standards in
some of these jurisdictions;
Now therefore be it resolved thaL NASAA strongly supports those
member states who have adopted this additional investor protection.
Be it further resolved that NASAA will, when appropriate, provide
its resources and support to individual member states who are subject to
such attempts to weaken investor protection.
There were no dissenting votes to the resolution.
NASAA was a member of the committee formed to draft a Revised Uniform
Securities Act. However, in November, 1984, due to a conference draft of the Act
that "greatly undermine[d] merit review and other state substantive regulation,"
NASAA withdrew. Braisted, supra note 16, at 20, col. 2.
47. Smith interview, supra note 38; telephone interview with E.C. Anderson, Dir.
Fla. Sec. Div., in Tallahassee, Fla. (Mar. 18, 1985).
48. See supra note 42.
49. Sargent, supra note 36, at 284.
50. Cohen, Law, business associations urge overhaul of state securities laws, Newark
Star Ledger, Oct. 14, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
51. Telephone interview with Cyril Moscow, Chairman of the ABA Comm., in De-
troit, Mich. (Mar. 19, 1985). The first tentative draft of this ABA position paper
was publicly available in May of 1985.
52. See, e.g., Sargent, supra note 36, at 278.
53. See generally Statement of Jack Bailey, Iowa Dev. Comm'n, 15 SEc. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) fl 1882 (Oct. 7, 1983).
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nents and proponents of merit review have clearly rallied forces and
organized.54 It is in the wake of this current controversy that the Ne-
braska Legislature is examining the proposed elimination of merit
review.
III. THE NEBRASKA LAW
A. History and Practice
Nebraska's first security law was passed in 1913.55 It was subse-
quently amended in 1937, and remained unchanged until 1965. The
1937 statute contained merit review language.5 6 In 1965, the Legisla-
ture adopted three methods of registering securities: notification, co-
ordination, and qualification.5 7 Registration by notification is limited
to those securities issued by a company with a favorable earnings his-
tory for a minimum number of years.58 A nominal filing statement is
required, accompanied by a filing fee.59 Registration by coordination
is allowed when an offering has been filed with the SEC. A registra-
tion statement and prospectus, plus any additional required informa-
tion, are filed with the state Department of Banking and Finance,
Bureau of Securities.6 0 If all deadlines are met, Nebraska registration
will become effective 6 ' at the federal effective date.62 Registration by
qualification is the catch-all catagory, for all securities not entitled to
be registered by notification or coordination.63
54. See States Stop, supra note 39, at 131.
55. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 501, at 508 (1985).
56. If it appears to the Department of Banking that applicant has complied
with all the requirements of law and that the proposed plan of business
of the person issuing the securities is not unlawful, unfair, unjust, inequi-
table or against public policy; and if the bureau shall be satisfied of the
good business reputation of the issuing person and of its officers, direc-
tors or members ... the bureau shall authoriz[e] the issuance or sale of
securities described.
LB 378 § 11, 1937 Neb. Laws ch. 195, 802.
57. LB 848 § 4, 1965 Neb. Laws ch. 549, 1773.
58. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1105 (1983). See also 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) c 510
(1985).
59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1108 (1983).
60. See id. at § 8-1106. See also 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 511 (1985).
61. "Effective" is a term of art in the securities business. Under federal law the "ef-
fective date" is generally the twentieth day after filing with the SEC. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77h(a) (1982). Once a registration is "effective," the securities may be sold via a
final prospectus. I& at § 773(c). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1108 (1983).
62. See supra note 61.
63. "The qualification [registration] is registration with our office only. It is designed
for the smaller companies." Hearing on LB 263 Before the Committee on Bank-
ing, Commerce & Ins., 85th Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (statement of Barry Lake,
Legal Counsel for the Neb. Dept. Banking, Bureau of Sec.) [hereinafter cited as
1977 Hearing]. Less than 1/2 of 1% of all offerings filed and reviewed by the
Bureau of Securities are qualification offerings.
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The changes made in 1965 were to provide uniformity with other
state laws,64 and, in essence, adopted the language of the Uniform Se-
curities Act.65 The 1965 statute was designed to provide public protec-
tion by:
[r]equiring that all securities offered or sold to the public (unless exempt) be
registered with the Department of Banking in one of the manners provided in
the Act. Registration, basically, requires the seller to make afull disclosure as
to the issuer's business and all major factors pertaining to the particular se-
curities so that the proposed purchaser can make an informed investment de-
cision on whether to purchase the security.
6 6
The 1965 law did not provide for merit review. The unjust, unfair
and inequitable language was deleted. The law was designed to paral-
lel the federal law and its language required only full disclosure. As
stated by Warren Johnson, a Lincoln attorney speaking in favor of the
bill at the committee hearing: "This law is [basically] a full disclosure
of fair-play or tell-the-truth. Before you sell securities, you have to
tell the truth about the securities."6 7
In 1967, the legislature adopted special registration requirements
for qualification offerings.68 Specifically, the unjust, unfair and ineq-
uitable language was added. Now an application for registration of se-
curities by qualification can be denied in Nebraska if the registration
statement is incomplete or misleading or:
(1) Such order is in the public interest;
(2) The issuer's plan of business, or the plan of financing is either unfair,
unjus inequitable, dishonest, oppressive or fraudulent or would tend to work
a fraud upon the purchaser;
(4) The securities offered or. . . issued . . .are in excess of the reasonable
value thereof, or ... made with unreasonable amounts of options;. . .[or]
(5) The offering [is]... made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' or
sellers' discounts, commissions. . ., or promoters' profits .... 69
Thus, in 1967, the Nebraska legislature enacted the statutory provi-
sions for merit review only of qualification offerings and expressly did
not require the same for notification or coordination offerings.
64. "This bill is a uniform act... proposed by a group of commissioners on uniform
Laws." Hearing on LB 848 Before the Committee on Banking, Commerce & Ins.,
75th Neb. Leg. 1 (1965) (statement of Mr. Warren Johnson) [hereinafter cited as
1965 Hearing]. The Committee declared that "[u]niformity is desirable and nec-
essary." Committee Statement on LB 848, 75th Neb. Leg. (1965) [hereinafter
cited as 1965 Committee Statement].
65. See 1965 Hearing, supra note 64. The Uniform Securities Act was drafted and
adopted in 1956 by the Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs of State Laws. After nearly
five years of drafting, a Revised Uniform Securities Act was approved in August,
1985 by the National Conference. The new Act has not been adopted by any state
as of the time of this printing. See also Braisted, supra note 14, at 20, col. 3.
66. 1965 Committee Statement, supra note 64 (emphasis added).
67. 1965 Hearing, supra note 64, at 3.
68. 1967 Neb. Laws, ch. 29, § 4, at 146. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1109.01 (1983).
69. Id. at § 8-1109.01.
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In 1973 and again in 1977, minor changes were made in the registra-
tion by coordination and notification (non merit registration) provi-
sions. The changes did not affect the substance of the law with regard
to merit review.70 Today, under Nebraska law, "[s]ecurities registered
with the Nebraska Securities Bureau and not the federal government
are subject to fairness standards. However, securities registered with
both the Nebraska Securities and the federal government are not sub-
ject to fairness standards."71
Although the statutory language appears to provide for merit re-
view only with registration by qualification,72 this is not the current
practice or perception of the Nebraska Bureau of Securities. All offer-
ings of securities in Nebraska are reviewed on their merits73 pursuant
to regulations promulgated and adopted in 1976.74 There are, in es-
sence, six "merit" hurdles, which the Securities Bureau requires all
offerings to clear to be registered in Nebraska.7 5 Briefly, the regula-
tions first provide that an offering that has underwriting discounts or
commissions exceeding 10 percent of the aggregate amount of securi-
ties sold and selling expenses exceeding 5 percent of the aggregate
amount of securities sold will be looked at with disfavor.76 Second,
any cheap stock 77 that has been or will be issued must be justified.
The number of shares and consideration for the stock must be reason-
able, and cheap stock may be required to be deposited in escrow for a
specified period.7 8 Third, the officers, directors, or promoters of a pro-
motional or developmental company, (a start up company with no
track record) must personally invest at least 10 percent of the total
equity investment resulting from the sale of the initial public offer-
70. See LB 263, 1977 Neb. Laws 838; LB 167, § 4, 1973 Neb. Laws 464, 474-76.
71. Committee Statement to LB 263, Banking, Commerce & Ins. Comm., 85th Neb.
Leg., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Committee
Statement].
72. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
73. Herstein, interview, supra note 41. Barry Lake reiterated this fact, stating that
the statutory language of § 8-1109.01 is open-ended, and provides much latitude in
the merit review. A § 8-1109 registration can be denied only if there was a viola-
tion of the merit regulations. Telephone interview with Barry Lake, former
Legal Counsel, Neb. Bur. of Sec., in Lincoln, Neb. (Mar. 18, 1985).
Mr. Herstein stated that notification offerings sometimes are not subject to
merit review as they have their own requirements. The Nebraska Bureau of Se-
curities reviews only one or two notification filings a year, and none in the past
two years. Herstein interview, supra note 41.
74. 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 37,405-10 (1985). These regulations were originally
drafted by Barry Lake, based on the recommended regulations of the Midwest
Securities Commission (currently NASAA). Lake interview, supra note 73.
75. 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 37,405-10 (1984).
76. I& at 37,405.
77. Cheap stock is stock issued to promoters for consideration less than the public
offering price. Braisted, supra note 16, at 21, col. 1.
78. 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) f 37,405, & 37,406 (1985).
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ing.79 Fourth, unless preferential treatment regarding liquidation and
dividends is provided, securities without voting rights will not be al-
lowed.8 o Fifth, preferred stock and debentures will be scrutinized if
the company's cash flow for a specified period is insufficient to cover
the interest on the securities to be offered to the public.81 Finally, the
amount of options and warrants reserved for issuance shall be reason-
able in price and number.8 2 If the offering does not withstand this
merit review, the Bureau of Securities will work with the company in
order to help pass the deal.83 Most issuers will justify the structure of
the offering, work with the Bureau to restructure the deal, or with-
draw the registration and find a new state in which to register.84
Each registration that is filed is reviewed.8 5 When securities are
registered with the Nebraska Department of Banking, depending on
the type of registration, the issuer8 6 submits registration statements
and a prospectus to the agency.8 7 An agency examiner will then re-
view the offering documents, make notes, and compile a "comment
letter."88 This letter sets forth the deficiencies that the examiner
found, based on both the full disclosure items listed in the statute, and
on the merit regulations outlined above. The issuer is then asked to
justify the specified deficiencies. If he cannot or will not, the offering
is refused registration.8 9 In such a situation, the issuer will be permit-
ted to withdraw the offering or an order denying registration will be
issued.90 Rather than risk refusal, some issuers avoid states in which
merit review poses a potential problem.9 1 Therefore, application of
Nebraska merit review regulations is important.
79. Id. at 37,407.
80. Id. at 37,408.
81. Id. at 37,409.
82. Id. at 37,410.
83, Herstein interview, supra note 41.
84. Memorandum of Jack Herstein to Garry Rex, Counsel for the Comm. on Bank-
ing, Commerce & Ins. (Jan. 30, 1985). This memorandum was drafted to be
presented at the public hearing on LB 192, but was not presented. An issuer may
choose to withdraw a registration because it does not want a record of a denial.
Any denial must be subsequently reported.
85. During the period between Jan. 1, 1983 and June 30, 1985, 6,242 offerings were
filed in Nebraska. Interview with Robert S. Woodruff, legal counsel for the Ne-
braska Dept. of Banking and Fin., in Lincoln, Neb. (Sept. 3, 1985).
86. An issuer is defined as "any person who issues or proposed to issue any security
....." NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1101(6) (1983).
87. See id at §§ 8-1105 to 1107; Herstein interview, supra note 41.
88. This is essentially the same process followed by the SEC.
89. -Herstein interview, supra note 41.
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1108 (1983). See also id. at § 8-1108(3): "When a registration
statement is withdrawn before the effective date ... the director shall retain
fifty dollars of the fee."
91. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. For this reason, the number of denials
in a strong merit state may not appear to be substantial.
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B. The Validity of the Current Nebraska Regulatory Scheme
1. Statutory Language
In order to determine whether the Nebraska Bureau of Securities
has the authority to utilize the merit review regulations for all secur-
ity offerings, the statute must be examined. Because an administra-
tive agency is limited in its rule-making authority to those powers
granted to the agency by the statutes that it is to administer,92 the
specific language of Nebraska's statute is critical. When interpreting a
statute, "we look first to its language." 93 Elementary rules of statu-
tory construction provide that unless the language of a statute is am-
biguous, no recourse to interpretation from legislative history is
necessary.94 The plain words of the statute, together with its underly-
ing purpose, are the sources from which a statute should be
construed.95
The statutory language that provides for registration by notifica-
tion and coordination, section 8-1109, is clearly unambiguous. 96 In or-
der for the Director to deny, revoke, or suspend the effectiveness of an
offering, there must be a determination that the order "is in the public
interest" and the provisions of any one of ten sections is met.9 7 Not
one of these sections is discretionary so as to give the Director merit
power.98 The standard merit language "unjust, unfair, or inequitable,"
92. Bond v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 210 Neb. 663, 667, 316 N.W.2d 600, 602
(1982); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Willey, 275 F.2d 264 (8th Cir.), cerL
denied, 363 U.S. 827 (1960). See also Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d
128, 134 (8th Cir. 1960) (power of an administrative board is not power to make
law, but rather power to carry into affect will of legislature as expressed by the
statute).
93. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1980).
94. Hill v. City of Lincoln, 213 Neb. 517, 521, 330 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1983) (no interpre-
tation needed when words of statute are plain and unambiguous); Freese v. Doug-
las County, 210 Neb. 521, 526, 315 N.W.2d 638, 641 (1982) (primary rule of
construction is that intention of legislature is to be found in ordinary meaning of
words of a statute).
95. McMartin Indus. v. Vinal, 301 F. Supp. 749, 755 (D. Neb.), affd, 441 F.2d 1274 (8th
Cir. 1969).
96. Section 8-1109 clearly refers only to registration by notification or coordination.
There is no language in the section providing for a review under the fair, just or
equitable standard. In addition, the foremost authority or securities laws cites
Nebraska as being a non-merit review state, presumably from reading the statute.
See generally H. BLOOMANTHAL, supra note 7. See also Hearing on LB 192 Before
the Comm. on Banking, Commerce and Ins., 89th Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. 26 (1985)
[hereinafter cited at 1985 Hearing]. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
97. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1109 (1983).
98. It should be noted that subsection 2 allows the director to deny effectiveness if
"any rule, order, or condition lawfully imposed under sections 8-1101 to 8-1124
has been violated ...... Id. at § 8-1109.01. This language, however, does not pro-
vide the Director with power to use the regulations promulgated pursuant to § 8-




or "tending to work a fraud on the investor," is not in the statutory
text. Instead a security offering can be refused registration only if it:
(1) is incomplete or false; (2) violates any Nebraska Securities Act pro-
vision; (3) is the subject of an injunction; (4) is not eligible for notifica-
tion registration; (5) fails to comply with the federal coordination
rules; (6) is not accompanied by the filing fee; (7) is made by an issuer
who has lost or been denied authority to do business; (8) is incorrect,
incomplete, or calculated to deceive; (9) is made by a business found to
be unlawful by a court; or (10) is made with a refusal to furnish infor-
mation.99 The language "in the public interest" alone is not sufficient
to impose merit authority. Most free states have similar language in
their blue sky laws.' 00
On the other hand, Nebraska's merit review regulations are clearly
warranted by the language of section 8-1109.01, the registration by
qualification provision. The statutory language of section 8-1109.01
specifically allows the director to deny, suspend, or revoke the regis-
tration of "unfair, unjust, [or] inequitable" security offerings. Thus,
only the language of section 8-1109.01, not the statutory language of
section 8-1109, empowers the Bureau of Securities to review the merits
of notification or coordination offerings.10'
2. Legislative History
Even assuming that the statutory language is ambiguous, the legis-
lative history can be fairly read to mean that the Legislature intended
99. Id. at § 8-1109.
100. See, e.g., 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 13,112 (1985) (Colo.); 1A BLUE SKY L. REP.
28,137 (1985) (La.); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 40,123 (1985) (N.J.); 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) q 48,118 (1985) (Utah).
101. The regulations are not improperly drafted; they are simply being misapplied.
This fact becomes clear by a close reading of the regulations. For example, the
regulation titled Ch. 5, Securities, provides that the director may disfavor "any
application to register securities as not being in the public interest and tending to
work a fraud upon the investors .. " (emphasis added). Identical language is
found in § 8-1109.01, confirming the fact that the regulation may be applied pur-
suant to § 8-1109.01. Similar language is not found in § 8-1109. 2 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 1 37,405 (1985). Mr. Herstein contends that merit power to review
coordination and notification comes from the rule making provision of the Ne-
braska Securities Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1120(3) (1983). See infra text accom-
panying notes 112 & 113. That section provides that the Director "may from time
to time make, amend, and rescind such rules and forms as are necessary to carry
out the provisions of sections 8-1101 to 8-1104." Id. However, even though the
Security Act is to be liberally interpreted, Labenz v. Labenz, 198 Neb. 548, 550,
253 N.W.2d 855, 857 (1977), as noted previously, rules and regulations cannot ex-
ceed the scope of the statute or the statutory language. See supra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1122 (1983) ("Sections 8-1101 to
8-1124 shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose ... and to coordi-




section 8-1109 to be a "disclosure only" provision. In the 1965 commit-
tee hearing to adopt notification and coordination registrations, the
purpose of the bill was declared to be public protection.1 0 2 It was man-
dated that all securities offered or sold in Nebraska were to be regis-
tered with the State: "Registration, basically, requires the seller to
make a full disclosure as to the issuer's business and all major factors
pertaining to the particular securities so that the proposed purchaser
can make an informed investment decision on whether to purchase
the security."o3 Without discussion the Banking, Commerce and In-
surance Committee voted to advance the bill: five for, none against,
and three absent.1 04
During the floor debate, Senator Stromer explained what would
eventually become, section 8-1109:
Section 9 is the section which provides for denial suspension or the revocation
of a securities registration. Here again if there has been violation on the part
of the companies who [sic] securities are being offered in the state of Ne-
braska, this section allows a provision for the banking director or his subordi-
nates to withdraw the right to be sold in the state of Nebraska and these are
provisions which run all the way from a stop order, which is an immediate
stop on sales, to a provisionary suspension. You will see that they are rather
reasonable but are responsible and do protect generally the public who would
buy such securities from possible fraudulent sales.1 0 5
No mention of merit review was made,106 even though Nebraska pre-
viously was considered a merit state and the merit language, "unfair,
unjust, or inequitable," had been removed.107
Nebraska was attempting to follow the first Uniform Securities
Act by adopting LB 848.108 The Uniform Act provided two alterna-
102. 1965 Committee Statement, supra note 64 ("The new Act is designed to give the
public protection .... ").
103. 1965 Hearing, supra note 64, at 3 (statement of Warren Johnson).
104. Committee on Banking, Commerce & Ins., Executive Session Minutes on LB 848,
75th Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. (1965).
105. Floor Debate on LB 848, 75th Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. 2640 (1965) (statement of Sen.
Stromer) [hereinafter cited as Floor Debate].
106. Senator Stromer also explained how registration by coordination was to work:
"the registration may have been registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Act of 1933 and we merely coordinate through
the federal functionaries and the registration is an academic one more than any-
thing else." Id at 2639. It should be noted that the debate took place in 1965. The
final rules regarding merit authority were not promulgated until 1976.
107. Senator Bowen, for example, characterized the regulatory scheme as follows:
[I]n Nebraska's present blue-sky law which has a number of exemptions
[sic] has as a standard for issue a permit to sell securities in Nebraska but
the proposed plan of business of the person issuing the securities is not
unlawful, unjust, unfair, inequitable, or against public policy and that
the enterprise contemplated is not to be a mere scheme of a promoter to
obtain money or property at the expense of the purchaser.
Id. at 2639 (statement of Senator Bowen). See also supra note 56 and accompany-
ing text.
108. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. See also 1965 Committee State-
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tives, one adopting merit review and the other denying it.109 Any po-
tential merit provisions were removed from the language adopted by
the Nebraska Legislature in 1965.110 Furthermore, if Nebraska had
merit authority, pursuant to the statute enacted in 1965, it would not
have been necessary to amend the law in 1967 to provide merit review
for qualification offerings. It may, therefore, be concluded that the
statute contemplates coordination and notification registration only by
full disclosure and that merit powers were neither intended nor
provided.11
3. Rebuttal
In fairness, it must be mentioned that when the regulations were
adopted under the Nebraska Securities Act, they were intended to ap-
ply to all three types of registration: notification, qualification, and
coordination. Barry Lake, then Legal Counsel for the Securities Bu-
reau, testified at the public hearing to adopt the present regulations
before the Nebraska Department of Banking:
These rules, if adopted, will apply to all three types of registration in Ne-
braska, by notification, by coordination and by qualification. It is specifically
intended they should have a substantial effect on the coordination offerings in
the State and they shall apply to all coordination offerings, and give the Secur-
ity Bureau more power in regulating the offer of securities by coordination.
Section 1120 of the Act gives the Nebraska Securities Bureau and the Di-
rector of Banking authority to adopt rules, and Section 1109(2) ... gives the
Director of Banking authority to deny registration by coordination if any rules
promulgated by the Bureau are violated by persons registering securities.1 1 2
The Securities Bureau may contend that there is broad and inher-
ment, supra note 64 ("LB 848, with certain modifications to meet local Nebraska
conditions, is a Uniform State Law already adopted by eighteen states and the
District of Columbia.").
109. See UNIF. SEC. AcT § 306, 7B U.L.A. 620-21, 23 (1983):
(a) The [Administrator] may issue a stop order denying effectiveness
to, or suspending or revoking the effectiveness of, any registration state-
ment if [he] finds (1) that the order is in the public interest and (2) that
(e) the offering has worked or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers
or would so operate;
The Commissioner's note further provides:
Clause (E): Section 401(a) provides that the term "fraud" is not lim-
ited to a common-law deceit. But this clause is not designed to be as
broad as the "sound business principles" standard or the "fair, just, and
equitable" standard found in some statutes.
Id. at 574-75, 576. An alternate "fair, just, and equitable" standard was adopted by
most states." See Braisted, supra note 14, at 20, col. 2.
110. Note that there is no discretionary language in § 8-1109. The merit provisions of
the Uniform Act set forth in subparagraph (e) above was not included in § 8-1109.
111. Furthermore, the merit regulations, previously cited and discussed, were not
promulgated until after Barry Lake, former legal counsel, was employed with the
Neb. Bur. of Sec. See also supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
112. Proceedings Before the Neb. Dept. Banking, July 28, 1976, at 5-6.
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ent power to subject all security offerings to merit review. This power
is arguably derived from the enabling language of section 8-1120(2),
which provides the director with the power to make rules and regula-
tions,113 and section 1109(2), which allows denial of any registration in
violation of a rule or regulation "lawfully imposed" under the Securi-
ties Act.114
This argument, however, is circular. Rules and regulations can
only be promulgated if there exists sufficient statutory authority. The
agency or department cannot legislate; it can only establish rules that
constitute a reasonable exercise of the powers conferred.llS The Ne-
braska Supreme Court has been clear and consistent in its posture on
this point: "An administrative board has no power or authority other
than that specifically conferred upon it by statute or constitution nec-
essary to accomplish the purpose of the act."1 1 6 The language of the
statute does not provide such broad authority, even though it was
clearly intended that the regulations apply to all security offerings in
the state. There is simply no statutory language that authorizes the
application of merit regulations to coordination and notification
offerings.
The argument may be made that the fraud provision, § 8-1102, is
the basis for merit authority. Section 8-1102 provides that it is unlaw-
ful, in connection with a securities offering, "[t]o employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud."". 7 The language was enacted to deter
fraud and dishonesty when selling or offering securities because the
system is subject to such abuse.1 18 The language does not operate to
equalize the risk of loss or the opportunity for profit between promot-
ers and investors, as is the purpose of merit review.119 As such, the
fraud provision is separate from merit power. With a different func-
tion and purpose, § 8-1102 cannot be said to empower the Bureau of
Securities to pass on the merits of an offering.
4. Approaches
Ninety-nine percent of the offerings filed in Nebraska are coordi-
nation or notification registrations. 120 Given the express terms of both
113. NEB. REV. STAT. § 1120(3) (1983) ("The director may from time to time make,
amend, and rescend such rules and forms as are necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of [this Act].").
114. Id. at § 8-1109(2).
115. Board of Regents v. County of Lancaster, 154 Neb. 398, 48 N.W.2d 221 (1951).
116. University Police Officers v. University of Neb., 203 Neb. 4, 8, 277 N.W.2d 529, 535
(1979).
117. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1102 (1983). As indicated, see supra note 26, LB 801 would
delete the fraud language from the statute.
118. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
120. Woodruff interview, supra note 85.
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the statute and its legislative history, those filings may not be subject
to merit review under the current statute or regulations. The Securi-
ties Bureau appears to have merit review power over only the remain-
ing 1 percent, the qualification offerings.' 2 ' In order to determine
whether the Securities Bureau's regulations are within the ambit of
the Statutory language, several approaches are available.
First, a law suit could be brought challenging the denial of a coordi-
nation offering based on the merit regulations. However, because of
the inherent inefficiency of such an action, this course is unlikely.122
Timing is essential when registering securities, especially in a coordi-
nation offering. If the state does not allow the registration to go effec-
tive on the SEC effective date, 2 3 securities cannot be sold in
Nebraska. It is simpler and more efficient to either negotiate and jus-
tify the terms or to withdraw to another state.' 4
Second, a complaint may be made directly to the Bureau of Securi-
ties. Any interested person may petition an agency for the repeal or
amendment of any rule. 25 This avenue is unlikely to be productive.
The Bureau was instrumental in promulgating the present regulations
and has a vested interest in maintaining them.
Third, an issuer could request a hearing before the Nebraska Legis-
lature Administrative Rules and Regulations Committee.126 The is-
suer would argue that by applying merit regulations to coordination
and notification offerings under section 8-1109, the Bureau of Securi-
ties has overstepped its statutory authority127 If the Committee
agreed, they might recommend that the agency amend or repeal its
rules.' 28 If the agency does not act within thirty days, the Committee
has the power to suspend the operation of the rules,n9 and during the
following legislative session submit a bill to formally repeal the
121. "I think it is important to point out that merit review comes in-to-play when the
offering is one which must be made by 'qualification."' 1985 Hearing, supra note
96, at 24 (statement of Ralph P. Cuca, Jr., representing BLN Investment Corp.).
See also sup'ra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. The author does not suggest
that Nebraska should not have merit review for all registrations, only that it does
not from the present statutory language.
122. See Goodkind, supra note 2, at 80 n.5.
123. See supra note 61.
124. The lack of case law challenging blue sky laws justifies this contention. See Good-
kind, supra note 2, at 81 n.5. See also supra notes 84 & 90.
125. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-910 (1983).
126. The Committee is established by the Rules of the Neb. Unicameral, 89th Neb.
Leg., 1st Sess., Rule 3, § 1, at 13 (1985).
127. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
128. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-910 (1983).
129. Id. at § 84-901. The statute may have constitutional problems. Similar federal
statutes have been declared unconstitutional on the ground that a committee does
not have the authority to repeal the force of a statute created by the Legislature.
Telephone interview with Mary Fischer, Counsel for the Neb. Admin. Rules &
Regulations Comm., in Lincoln, Neb. (Apr. 11, 1985).
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rules.13° Of course, this is the worst alternative. If the rules were sus-
pended, the Bureau of Securities would have no merit power until the
rules were formally repealed and new regulations promulgated. The
period of no statutory or regulatory authority would depend on the
speed and efficiency of the Legislature. In the meantime, the Bureau
would be helpless to regulate any unfair, unjust, or inequitable secur-
ity offerings.
Finally, the statutory provisions providing for merit review could
be permanently repealed. If enacted, LB 801 would do that and more.
In one fell swoop, Senator DeCamp's bill, as amended by the Banking
Committee, would delete all statutory authority for merit review and
all statutority authority for policing fraud.131 By implication the rules
and regulations relevant to merit review also would be repealed. 3 2
The result would be disasterous.
V. RESULTS OF ELIMINATING MERIT REVIEW
Although it appears that the Bureau of Securities may have over-
reached its authority by requiring merit review for all Nebraska secur-
ity filings, this Article has not reviewed the issue of the propriety of
merit power or the consequences of LB 192. At first blush, the elimi-
nation of merit review might appear to be a sagacious move. Upon
further reflection, it becomes apparent that there is some merit to
merit review. The following is an analysis of the arguments generally
advanced to support proposals to repeal merit review.
A. Paternalism
It has been argued that merit review is purely government pater-
nalism.133 Big brother state is watching over the uninformed citizen
in order to protect him. There is the belief that the marketplace
should be run by supply and demand without government interfer-
ence. However, such a capitalist market is premised on the notion of
full disclosure and complete knowledge.134 If all material information
is available and disseminated through the marketplace, the securities
market should run efficiently, and investors could then make intelli-
130. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901 (1983). See also Fischer interview, supra note 129. Ms.
Fischer noted that whether the Committee would vote to suspend the rules de-
pends on the various Senators' theories of legislative delegation.
131. See supra note 26.
132. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DIv., 89th NEB. LEG. 1st SESS., SECURITIES REGULATION:
MODIFICATION OF "MERIT REVIEW" STANDARDS 12 (1985).
133. See, e.g., Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 1447, 1478-93 (1969); Tyler, supra note 2, at 909; Sosin & Fein, The
Landmark 1983 Amendments to the Illinois Securities Law, 72 ILL. BAR J. 196,
196 (1983).




Such a perfect system, unfortunately, does not exist. Although all
material information must be available, it is often not disseminated
and, more often, not understood.-3 6 The prospectus, upon which in-
vestment decisions are to be based, allegedly contains all the data
upon which to make an intelligent decision. 137 Yet, there is no re-
quirement that an investor receive a final prospectus prior to the
purchase of securities. 3 8 In reality, the final prospectus is generally
provided at the time that the investor receives the stock he has al-
ready agreed to purchase. Furthermore, the prospectus or offering
memorandum is usually far too complex. It is covered with disclaim-
ers. Important financial and structural data are often hidden.39 The
unsophisticated investor usually will not even attempt to wade
through the document, often assuming that registration with the state
and the SEC means government approval. Even though the informa-
tion is available in theory, it is not in practice. The full information,
free marketplace simply does not exist. If it did, no one would ever
purchase a bad security. As the former Nebraska Bureau of Securities
counsel stated: "No one buys a pig in a poke if they know they're buy-
ing a pig in a poke."140 As it is, unbelievably inequitable promotion
schemes are sold to unwary investors daily.141
135. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. See also S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
136. See, ag., Letter from Matthew J. Zale, Ariz. Dir. of Sec., to Honorable Jeremiah
Joyce, Chairperson of the Sen. Finance & Credit Reg. Comm. (May 26, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Zale Letter].
One individual in Nebraska noted:
Many of the types of securities offerings which we are talking about to-
day are so complex that even a sophisticated investor would not be able
to ascertain some facts which may clearly alter the deal. ... I deal ex-
clusively in the securities area and have my jurisdoctorate degree from
the University of Nebraska and sometimes I have a hell of a time figur-
ing out the essence of a securities offering even after having read the
prospectus. I don't think it is reasonable to expect an investor to be able
to sufficiently analyze these types of offerings.
1985 Hearing, supra note 96, at 26 (1985) (statement of Ralph P. Cuca, Jr., repre-
senting BLN Investment Corp.).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1982); Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Sec. Act Release No.
5101, Nov. 19, 1970.
138. The Act states only that "[it shall be unlawful for any person... to carry...
any security for the purpose of sale . . . unless accompanied or preceded by a
prospectus .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
139. 1985 Hearing, supra note 96, at 14-16 (statement of Jack Hiatt, Utah Comm'r of
Sec.).
140. Lake interview, supra note 73.
141. Examples of such schemes were provided to the Banking Comm. at the public
hearing on LB 192. Several recent Arizona offerings are also exemplary:
Pleistocene, Inc.-Whose full disclosure showed that company would in-
vest in a product yet to be named "somewhere in the world."
International Totalizator Systems, Inc.-Producing a race track com-
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Proponents of merit review often stress that securities are sold, not
bought.142 People who sell securities are not altruistic. Their job is to
sell securities. Because "the capital raising process is governed by
greed,"143 the investor must be cautious, knowledgeable, or powerful
in order to protect his investment. Merit review, although possibly
overbroad in its scope, assumes that the investor is none of the above
and needs the state's protection; it prevents a promoter from selling a
"pig in a poke."
Unless disclosure is also repealed, eliminating merit review does
not remedy the problem of paternalism. Disclosure is not the an-
titheis of merit review;144 it is also government intervention. Even
with the SEC, which theoretically oversees a pure disclosure system, if
reviewers don't approve of an offering "they can disclose an offering to
death." Paternalism will exist as long as registration exists. It is sim-
ply the degree that must be decided upon.
B. Discretion
Very close to the paternalism argument is the issue of dissatisfac-
tion with the amount of discretion afforded each state administrator.
It is common knowledge among securities lawyers that some states are
"tough" states.145 If offerings have been cleared in those states, other
merit states are more likely to allow registration.146 These differences
among and between states are not justified by the site of the registra-
tion. For example, an offering registered in Nebraska, Colorado, and
Missouri may be denied in Missouri, registered in Colorado, and only
allowed to be registered in Nebraska upon the condition that cheap
stock is put in escrow.147 Clearly any difference in the location of the
puter mechanism which was an insolvent company whose license to sell
the products had been revoked by the Colorado Racing Commission.
A company offering to produce windmills in Arizona that had repre-
sented it had 1,800 windmills sold to the Navajo Indian Tribe turned out
not to have had a contract at all and withdrew after the Division raised a
comment.
Zale letter, supra note 136, at 2-3.
142. Telephone interview with Philip Feigan, Assistant Sec. Comm'r, Colo. Dept. of
Sec., in Denver, Colo. (Mar. 8, 1985).
143. Lake interview, supra note 73.
144. Telephone interview with Mark Sargent, Prof., Univ. of Bat., School of Law, in
Balt., Md. (Mar. 9, 1985). Professor Sargent is on the ABA Subcommittee study-
ing merit review and authored the subcommittee's position paper.
145. Telephone interview with Fred Bunker Davis, attorney with Kutak, Rock &
Campbell, in Omaha, Neb. (Mar. 18, 1985); Spratlin interview, supra note 42. Mr.
Spratlin noted that Texas was known as a "tough state."
146. Davis interview, supra note 145. If an offering possesses the merit requirements
of three to six states with strong merit review (depending on their reputation and
the terms of offering), "Nebraska will most likely allow the offering. In essence,
Nebraska takes a free ride on those states' examinations." Id.
147. See 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 37,406(c) (1985). ("The administrator may re-
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offering is not enough to warrant such disparate results.
Although the discretion argument has some basis, the opposite ex-
treme-no discretion-appears to be as undesirable. Among the ad-
ministrators of the "free" states, there is a strong feeling that some
discretion to police clearly worthless securities is needed.148 As long
as full disclosure is made in most "free" states, the offering cannot be
refused. Without discretion to review the securities being offered
there is limited or no investor protection.
Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that administrator
judgment regarding the offering of securities results in fewer registra-
tions. One securities attorney describing the system stated that there
are generally "a dozen cases of not exercising authority for every case
of exceeding authority."149 One statement is not an empirical study;
but it does indicate that statutory provisions that allow discretion may
not always be used. Moreover, merit review works only "if it is done
properly."150 If a philosophy of capital promotion is endorsed and pur-
sued, abuse of discretion should be kept to a minimum.
Uniformity of state review appears to be a better solution to the
problem of abuse of discretion than complete elimination of discretion
itself. The goal of national uniformity in blue sky laws is not in the
foreseeable future. It is true that most states have adopted some form
of the Uniform Securities Act,'5' and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently approved a revised
Uniform Securities Act.152 Still, each state selected and revised provi-
sions of the first uniform act to fit the temperament of its legislature
and various lobbies. The result has been a not-so-uniform set of state
laws premised on the original "Act."15 3 The outlook for change to-
ward uniformity in the near future is not bright.
C. Capital
Elimination of merit review cannot be discussed without the prom-
ise of increased capital in the state. 5 4 The contention is that if issuers
were not faced with the frustration of merit review more offerings
quire all cheap stock to be deposited in escrow under such terms and conditions
as the administrator shall prescribe."). The purposes of escrow are to prevent
excessive dilution of the public's investment and to prevent insiders from bailing
out. Goodkind, supra note 2, at 92. See also Braisted, supra note 16, at 21, col. 1-2.
148. Telephone interview with E. C. Anderson, Dir. Fla. Sec. Div., in Tallahassee, Fla.
(Mar. 18, 1985); Feigan interview, supra note 142; McLelland interview, supra
note 39.
149. Davis interview, supra note 145.
150. Lake interview, supra note 73.
151. Goodkind, supra note 2, at 83.
152. See supra note 65.
153. See supra notes 17 & 40-51 and accompanying text.
154. DeCamp interview, supra note 24. See also J. MOFSKY, supra note 10, at 79; Sar-
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would be made, resulting in more jobs, more industry, and an en-
hanced economy. The argument is appealing, but in reality "really
baloney."155
First, there is no empirical data to prove that merit review hinders
the capital market. On the contrary, securities offerings are "not the
favorite form of financing for small businesses. [I]n a 1980 survey of
1,000 small firms, only 2 percent would choose selling shares as their
first choice of financing."156 Most firms cannot justify the fixed costs
of issuing equity shares or the maintenance of a secondary market in
such stock.157
Second, a 1983 Nebraska study of financing for small businesses
concluded that there "is no shortage of equity capital in Nebraska
.... "158 The problem lies instead in high interest rates and a heavy
reliance "on personal savings and bank loans for starting and ex-
panding businesses."5 9 Mark Nelson of the Nebraska Investment Fi-
nance Authority reiterated this view: "It is not the regulations, but a
lack of offerings"; Nebraska doesn't promote its ideas.16o A glance at
the "high tech" investment centers of the country lends further
credence to the fact that merit review does not hinder capital growth.
California and Massachusetts, two "tough" merit states, lead the coun-
try in security offerings.1 61 Merit review is not the problem. It ap-
pears instead that lack of education, promotional opportunities, and
economic development are hindering capital growth in Nebraska.
An argument can be advanced on the other side. Removal of merit
review could impair the capital structure of the state. When substan-
tive review is eliminated, the "penny stock market" grows.1 62 Exam-
ples abound in Utah, Colorado, and New Jersey, "the hell-hole fraud
gent, supra note 36, at 278; Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 W. & LEE L. REV. 899,
904-05 (1971).
155. Sargent interview, supra note 144.
156. Equity Capital for Nebraska Small Businesses, Report of Governor Kerrey's
Small Business Equity Financing Task Force 27 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Ker-
rey Study].
157. Stall, Small Firms' Access to Public Equity Financing, The Inter-Agency Task
Force on Small Business Finance, at 5 (1981).
158. Kerrey Study, supra note 156, at ii (chairman's summary).
159. Id.
160. Telephone interview with Mark Nelson (Feb. 25, 1985). Nebraska was recently
rated the "next-to-worst" state for starting small businesses by INC. Magazine.
Robert Bernier, director of the UNO Business Development Center concluded
that Nebraska "tend[s] not to have real strong investment activity in general, and
so a lot of our money gets shipped out of state." Lincoln Star, Oct. 1, 1985, at 11,
col. 4.
161. Sargent interview, supra note 144. See also St. Louis Globe Democrat, May 30,
1983, at 8A, col. 1.
162. Letter from Royce 0. Griffin, Colo. Sec. Comm'n, to the Hon. Jeremiah Joyce,
Chairman Ill. Senate Fin. and Credit Regulation Comm., May 27, 1983.
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capitals of the world." 163 Penny stocks are those that generally sell
for under five dollars a share and are traded on the over-the-counter
market (OTC),164 rather than the major stock exchanges.165 In 1982
and 1983, "nearly half the companies that went public in the $1 and
under range had participants with histories of securities injunctions,
violations, fraud, or associations with reputed crime figures."166 The
penny stock market can be analogized to government sanctioned gam-
bling.167 Because the price of these speculative offerings is so low, the
investor's money can be theoretically doubled or tripled quickly. In-
vestors generally intend to sell the stocks immediately to a "greater
fool."16s Since the price of the stock bears no relation to the value of
the issuing company the balloon inevitably bursts.16 9 Just as in a
chain letter or pyramid scheme, the last investor bears the loss.
Unethical practices also occur with greater frequency in non-merit
163. Telephone interview with Bruce Burditt, Exec. Secretary of NASAA, in Wichita,
Kan. (Feb. 27, 1985).
164. Over-the-counter securities are not traded on a registered stock exchange. The
OTC is mainly a market conducted over the telephone. GovERNoR's SECURITIES
FRAUD TASK FORCE, UTAH DEPT. Bus. REGULATION 40 (1984). [hereinafter cited
as UTAH STUDY].
165. Griffin letter, supra note 162.
166. Barren, Bad Pennies, VENTURE, Nov. 1983, at 38.
167. Sargent interview, supra note 144. See also Barren, supra note 166, at 44:
To see how 1983's new issues compare with IPO's of a year earlier,
VENTURE surveyed the 22 new issues at $1 or less that became effective
in July of 1983. In fully half (11), participants included felons, convicted
or enjoined securities violators or their relatives or associates, or reputed
crime figures. They include many of the same lawyers, underwriters,
and major shareholders involved in 1982 issues. Among 1983's new is-
sues:
Venture Consolidated. A creation of attorney Benjamin Sprechter,
this $.01 offering lists as vice-president and largest shareholder Daniel
Pentelute. In 1978, Pentelute was barred from association with any bro-
ker or dealer by the SEC.
Envirocare Inc. An entry by attorney Gary Wolff, this company plans
to service nuclear power plants. The $500,000 raised at $.10 a share is
expected to last it for only three months, according to the prospectus.
The second largest shareholder is Pasquale Catizone, who has been en-
joined for securities violations numerous times.
168. As one observer noted:
The regional head of the Securities Exchange Commission in Denver de-
scribes this phenomena as an application of the "greater fool" theory.
This theory states that no matter how stupid I am to buy this worthless
stock, I believe there is someone out there stupider than I who will pay
more for it than I did. The essential point here is that the people who
fall victim to the penny stockmarket are typically not sophisticated in-
vestors, but ordinary citizens, busdrivers, secretaries, laborers and virtu-
ally anyone else who can put together a hundred dollars.




states.'7 0 Such practices include puffery (wild exaggerations of the
stock's performance), tying (requiring the purchaser to buy stock he
doesn't want in order to get the one he does), contradictory recom-
mendations (creating the appearance of interest and activity in the
stock), churning (unnecessary and harmful purchases and sales from a
person's account resulting primarily in commissions to the agent), un-
authorized trades, and refusals to sell.171 The result is a poor eco-
nomic mood. Legitimate businesses find it difficult to raise capital
because of loss of confidence in the marketplace. In Colorado in 1983,
for example, "virtually no business could be taken public, no matter
how meritorious, because the local investors had been burned so re-
cently and so badly in Denver issues."172
Obviously, removal of merit review will not automatically result
in an influx of "penny" stocks. But, "[p]enny stocks are a phenomena
which only exist where there is no merit review provided at the state
level."173 This is because no matter how unfair or ridiculous the terms
of an offering are, if they are fully disclosed, the state must permit the
offering.7 4 If it is true that penny stocks create a poor investor cli-
mate, the repeal of merit review could do more harm than good. Still,
full merit review of all offerings may not be necessary to combat only
securities sold "with no business purpose whatsoever except to raise
money from the public."175 Less stringent alternatives may be
available.
D. Hurts Small Businesses
The argument that small businesses are hurt by merit review is
made with little knowledge of the system. Every discussion of merit
review mentions the Apple computer offering and contends that Ap-
170. Id. See also Cohen, 'Penny Stock' haven: Jersey's weak laws give promoters afree
Reign, Newark Star Ledger, Jan. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
171. Griffin letter, supra note 39.
172. Id. In 1982, the Better Business Bureau in Colorado endorsed the return of merit
review.
173. d See also Burditt interview, supra note 163; Feigan interview, supra note 142.
174. I suppose that if the 'full disclosure' statute read that if the Commis-
sioner is allowed to put the following legend on the offering it might
work:
(a.) This offering is probably a fraud.
(b.) The company officers will probably embezzle the money.
(c.) There are insider transactions in this filing that amount to looting
and theft.
(d.) The state is not yet able to prove embezzlement, looting or theft,
but upon the expenditure of $50,000 to $100,000 we will probably im-
prison the entrepreneurs on this filing in about a year.
(e.) Investors are welcome to invest.
Zale letter, supra note 136.
175. Smith interview, supra note 38.
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ple was turned down in several states.176 The natural response is that
merit review should be abolished. The response is overbroad. Mis-
takes will be made in any system, and there is the potential for abuse
of any amount of discretion. It does not follow that merit review is
bad.
Merit review does not entirely preclude the sale of any security.
Securities sold in other states may be sold in the secondary market in
Nebraska without registration.177 In addition, an unsolicited order or
offer to buy a security through a registered broker-dealer is also not
subject to registration.s78 Even with a denial of registration the issuer
can still market his stock.
As stated earlier most small businesses do not choose or cannot
justify a public offering of stock.179 For these smaller venture capital
deals, exemptions exist both at the federal and state levels that pro-
vide for the raising of capital with only disclosure and minimum filing
requirements. 8 0 In addition, there are other methods of financing
available. The promoter must choose whether or not to comply with
the merit regulations or select an alternative source. Merit review, as
defined previously, is a method of maintaining an equity relationship
between the issuer and the investor.'18 As such, the issuer always has
the option of complying with the regulations-that is, maintaining
commissions at 5 percent of sales or not issuing large amounts of war-
rants to "overhang" on the market. 8 2 If the issuer chooses not to com-
ply, it is hard to say that merit review thwarted his financing scheme.
E. Poor Training
Securities are reviewed in each state by employees who may or
may not have any business or legal training. Often the reviewers have
entered their positions directly from undergraduate or law school.
Furthermore, it is argued that the reviewers are far removed from the
capital market and don't understand the compromises that must be
made in order to finance a deal.183
Low pay and poor staffing may be inherent in any government
agency. Nevertheless, the training and skill of the administrators does
176. Burditt interview, supra note 163; Herstein interview, supra note 41; Spratlin in-
terview, supra note 42.
177. NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-1111(2) (1983).
178. Id. at § 8-1111(3).
179. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 15 & infra notes 193-97. Clearly not every offering will fit within
an exemption. However, many offerings can be purposefully structured to avoid
the registration requirements.
181. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
182. 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 37,405-10 (1985).
183. Hearings on § 19(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, Washington, D.C. (1983) (state-
ments of Steven Merrill and Michael J. Halloran).
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not have to be, and in many states, is not a problem.18 4 NASAA spon-
sors workshops and committees to train state administrators.18 5 In-
vestment bankers, securities lawyers, and broker-dealers participate
in these and help explain how and why a deal is structured. Thus,
effort is being made to improve the system. Furthermore, removal of
merit review won't solve the problem of undertrained or un-
derbudgeted departments. Training and budget priority are better
solutions.
F. Overinclusive
It is argued that merit review, although potentially a necessity, is
overbroad in its scope. It is like "using a sledgehammer to swat a
fly."1s6 There is some truth to this assertion, at least at the federal
level and in the case of the sophisticated investor. Some investments
may need review, but well-established, financially sound firms with a
proven track record do not need government scrutiny. Such "blue
chip" 8 7 firms provide the prospective investor with federally re-
quired, public reports that contain information relevant to making an
informed investment decision. In addition, certain persons may not
need the government protection, either because they are financially
able to bear the burden of the loss, they are powerful enough to de-
mand the requisite information, or they are sophisticated enough to
understand the intricacies of the deal. Federal exemptions for such
accredited investors exist,18 8 under the theory that these investors
generally can fend for themselves. They don't need or want govern-
ment intervention.
The move may prove to be too broad if merit review is eliminated
on the state level. Precluding all administrative review in order to
give those investors with knowledge, or financial ability to bear the
loss, the chance to invest is inefficient. Rather, specific exemptions for
the "special" investor seem to be a better solution to the problem.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The total elimination of merit review and anti-fraud protection, as
proposed by LB 801 is a drastic and unwarranted step. Some con-
184. Burditt interview, supra note 163; Herstein interview, supra note 41.
185. Id.
186. Sargent interview, supra note 144.
187. A "blue chip" stock is one issued by a substantial company with a proven histori-
cal record that demonstrates its soundness and is generally offered on the OTC
market. Twenty states had "blue chip" exemptions in 1983. R. FEIN & S. SOSIN,
supra note 41, at 10. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1110(8) (1983).
188. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252 (1985). An "accredited" investor is one who meets any of eight
requirements regarding sufficient net worth, net income or status so as to qualify
for special treatment under the federal securities laws.
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sumer protection is necessary. This conclusion is bolstered by the
many investment "horror" stories recently given press attention.18 9
The authors of studies in several states have also reached the conclu-
sion that something more than disclosure is needed.190 The issue then
becomes what kind of government intervention will best serve Ne-
braska investors, yet not intrude too heavily on investor autonomy.
LB 801, in its present form, provides for the total elimination of merit
review and the anti-fraud sections without due attention being given
to the consequences. As such, LB 801 presents the same problem that
it is attempting to correct; it is overbroad in its scope. This section of
this Article will set forth alternative proposals for revising Nebraska's
securities law.
First, the legislature must determine what the goal of its blue sky
law is. Consumer protection has consistently been cited as the func-
tion of the Nebraska Securities Act.1 91 If this is so, merit review
should not be removed solely for the possibility of increased venture
capital in the state. Instead, the decision must be made as to which
investors should be protected. As noted previously, not all purchasers
of securities need government scrutiny of their investments. Exemp-
tions can be made for "fat cat" 19 2 and "big ticket"193 investors. Proof
of sufficient investment knowledge or financial security could be pro-
vided to exempt such investors from merit review. For these invest-
ments, full disclosure alone would be sufficient.
Illinois enacted such exemptions in 1984.194 The Illinois law ex-
empts persons "with a net worth in excess of $1,000,000 or had individ-
ual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years
and who reasonably expect an income in excess of $200,000 in the cur-
rent year,"1 95 and persons "who purchase at least $150,000 of securities
... where the purchase or total price does not exceed 20 percent of
the purchaser's net worth." 19 6 These exemptions are based on the
189. See, e.g., Bus. WK., July 16, 1984, at 131 (Denver new-issues crash of 1982); VEN-
TURE, Nov. 1983, at 39 (Biosonics, Inc. deficits); Newark Star-Ledger, Jan. 23,
1985, at 10; Wall St. J., Oct. 16,1984, at 10, col. 1 ("Bubble Burst in 1983"); Chicago
Tribune, Aug. 28,1983, Business Section at 1, col. 1 (various examples); St. Louis
Globe-Democrat, May 30, 1983, at 8A, col. 1 (penny stocks).
190. See, e.g., ARiz. HOUSE SELECr COMM. ON ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, FINAL REPORT
(1983); UTAH STUDY, supzra note 156.
191. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 96, at 7; 1977 Committee Statement, supra note 71;
1977Hearings, supra note 62, at 4; 1965 Committee Statement, supra note 66; 1965
Hearings, supra note 64.
192. A "fat cat" is an investor who has enough money to absorb the loss should the
offering be a bad risk. See S. SOsIN & R. FaIN, supra note 41, at 16.
193. A "big ticket" sale is one that is large enough to demonstrate that the purchaser
is financially able to afford the deal. Id. at 18.
194. Id. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.




theory that such investors have the knowledge and income to fend for
themselves. Similar revisions in Nebraska law would eliminate some
of the overbreadth of the present merit review system.
Second, the Legislature should direct the focus of the securities bu-
reau. A secondary objective of the blue sky laws should be to promote
a confident and active securities market in the state. Securities should
be reviewed with this goal in mind. "Blue chip" 97 issuers with
favorable earnings histories that have been in existence for a deter-
mined number of years should be allowed to register without merit
review. Small offerings, 9 8 where the company intended to use its cap-
ital in the state, could be subject to limited review. If the present stat-
ute were revised to allow more such exemptions, more department
time could be spent reviewing the disclosure statements of those offer-
ings with no stated or specific investment purpose. In this way, com-
panies that could increase or improve the capital market would be
given priority in terms of registration. Yet, those speculative offer-
ings, from which the unwitting investor needs protection, would still
be subject to merit review.
Third, the legislature must decide to fully fund and staff the Secur-
ities Bureau of the Banking Department. Because it is a revenue-pro-
ducer,199 the Department should be allowed to retain more money.
With more funds and staff,200 the Bureau could spend the appropriate
amount of time reviewing those securities and transactions that are
not exempt. Individualized and immediate attention by the Bureau
would encourage issuers to choose Nebraska as a registration site. The
additional funding would also provide a means for training staff in the
nuances of the investment business. The result will be a more effi-
cient and productive system.
With increased exemptions from registration and a larger staff,
more Bureau time can also be devoted to enforcing the fraud provi-
sions and prosecuting violators. Knowledge of a tough enforcement
system will tend to deter fraudulent and unscrupulous promoters.
With fewer "bad" deals taking place, the investment climate can flour-
197. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
198. Nebraska has some small offering exemptions, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1111
(1983), and security exemptions. See id. at § 8-1110. These exemptions need to be
reviewed and expanded in light of the goal of a more active state securities
market.
199. Funds are raised by the filing fee "of one-tenth of one percent of the aggregate
offering price of the securities which are to be offered in this state." Id. at § 8-
1108(3). Because of this fee, the Bureau of Securities is one of the few revenue
producing state offices. In 1983, it had revenues in excess of 3.5 million dollars,
more than enough to pay the costs of running the Bureau. Herstein interview,
supra note 41.
200. The Nebraska Bureau of Securities is presently composed of eight employees.
This number includes the director, two examiners, one counsel, and four staff
assistants who perform clerical duties.
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ish. The Bureau could coordinate its activities with the Department of
Economic Development to encourage businesses to choose Nebraska
as their home and to foster economic growth through the securities
market. Confidence in the system will hopefully help to increase the
amount of Nebraska dollars that are invested, providing new industry,
jobs, and a brighter economy.
Finally, there should be increased public education. Every justifi-
cation for merit review begins with the idea that the investor lacks the
knowledge or the skill to invest.20 1 The government should protect
such investors from those who would take advantage. Rather than
take away a purchaser's right to purchase, arm that person with suffi-
cient ammunition to make an intelligent choice. This might be done
in several ways. Advertising regarding the dangers of "too good a
deal" would increase consumer suspicion. The Bureau could develop
educational "dog and pony" programs that travel the state to educate
investors, especially in times and areas of fraudulent or unscrupulous
promotions. An investor "hot line" to answer questions regarding in-
vestments or a specific prospectus could be set up. A consumer protec-
tion division similar to the Better Business Bureau could be
established to enable purchasers to report bad deals and seek informa-
tion about others.202 A summary of the prospectus could be required
to be provided to each investor. These proposals would allow the in-
vestor to help himself and attempt to eliminate some of the paternal-
ism of an extensive merit system.2 03
VI. CONCLUSION
Nebraska should not abolish merit review. Implicit in the previous
discussion is the assumption that any proposals for reform are in addi-
tion to, not to the exclusion of, merit review. Although the scope of
merit review may be too broad, some merit power is necessary. The
state has a duty to protect its citizens from financial crimes, just as it
protects against other offenses. Nebraskans are afforded protection
through banking, insurance, health care, education, motor vehicle, and
other such laws. Protection of an individual's life-long savings is just
as important a state goal, and should not be abolished without much
thought and discussion.
It is a sincere hope that the Legislature will not alter the securities
law without a thorough study of all of the issues and consequences.
201. See supra notes 23 & 132-36 and accompanying text.
202. This particularly should be a goal of the Nebraska Legislature in light of the re-
cent numerous bank failures in the state. The public confidence in the economic
climate of Nebraska is low. The state must increase investor confidence and
boost the Nebraska economy. Improvement of the securities laws could only en-
hance that effort.
203. See also suggestions made in Kerrey Study, supra note 156, at 87-92.
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Input should be received from all facets of the investment community,
including lawyers, venture capitalists, brokers, dealers, investors, pro-
moters, and issuers. Both sides of the issue must be balanced to insure
that the state's goal of protecting the investor is achieved.
LB 801, in its present form, does not accomplish the goals it suppos-
edly sets out to achieve. It is overbroad and is being debated in a vac-
uum. Instead of eliminating all power the Bureau of Securities has to
protect Nebraska investors, the structure and purpose of Nebraska's
blue sky laws must be studied. The current misapplication of the
merit regulations should be reviewed and remedied with sufficient
statutory authority to justify the regulations. A comprehensive study
of the needs of state investors must be made. Only then can a bill be
introduced to remedy existing ills and provide a flexible vehicle to
equalize the risks of loss and the opportunities for profit. The result
hopefully will be a strong investment market.
Kim M. Robak, '85
